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-rw-r--r--package/mac80211/patches/300-pending_work.patch544
-rw-r--r--package/mac80211/patches/420-mac80211_ignore_invalid_ccmp_rx_pn.patch10
2 files changed, 549 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/package/mac80211/patches/300-pending_work.patch b/package/mac80211/patches/300-pending_work.patch
index 494c7942f..adf59f61a 100644
--- a/package/mac80211/patches/300-pending_work.patch
+++ b/package/mac80211/patches/300-pending_work.patch
@@ -532,3 +532,547 @@
ts->desc_id = MS(ads->status1, AR_TxDescId);
ts->ts_tstamp = ads->status4;
ts->ts_status = 0;
+--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/gfp.h>
+ #include <asm/unaligned.h>
+ #include <net/mac80211.h>
++#include <crypto/aes.h>
+
+ #include "ieee80211_i.h"
+ #include "michael.h"
+@@ -86,6 +87,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct
+ struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
++ int queue = rx->queue;
++
++ /* otherwise, TKIP is vulnerable to TID 0 vs. non-QoS replays */
++ if (rx->queue == NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES - 1)
++ queue = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
+@@ -148,8 +154,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct
+
+ update_iv:
+ /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
+- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
+- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
++ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
++ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
+
+ return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+@@ -165,6 +171,7 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+ struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+ struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
++ unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned int hdrlen;
+ int len, tail;
+ u8 *pos;
+@@ -192,11 +199,12 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+ pos += hdrlen;
+
+ /* Increase IV for the frame */
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
+ key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
+ if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
+ key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
+-
+- pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key, key->u.tkip.tx.iv16);
++ pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
+
+ /* hwaccel - with software IV */
+ if (info->control.hw_key)
+@@ -205,9 +213,8 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+ /* Add room for ICV */
+ skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN);
+
+- hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+ return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
+- key, pos, len, hdr->addr2);
++ key, skb, pos, len);
+ }
+
+
+@@ -235,6 +242,11 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
+ struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+ struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
++ int queue = rx->queue;
++
++ /* otherwise, TKIP is vulnerable to TID 0 vs. non-QoS replays */
++ if (rx->queue == NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES - 1)
++ queue = 0;
+
+ hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+@@ -255,7 +267,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
+ res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
+ key, skb->data + hdrlen,
+ skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
+- hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->queue,
++ hdr->addr1, hwaccel, queue,
+ &rx->tkip_iv32,
+ &rx->tkip_iv16);
+ if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
+@@ -283,6 +295,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
+ unsigned int hdrlen;
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+
++ memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN);
++
+ b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+ aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+
+@@ -373,8 +387,10 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+ struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+ struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+ int hdrlen, len, tail;
+- u8 *pos, *pn;
+- int i;
++ u8 *pos;
++ u8 pn[6];
++ u64 pn64;
++ u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+
+ if (info->control.hw_key &&
+ !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
+@@ -402,14 +418,14 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
+ pos += hdrlen;
+
+- /* PN = PN + 1 */
+- pn = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn;
++ pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
+
+- for (i = CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+- pn[i]++;
+- if (pn[i])
+- break;
+- }
++ pn[5] = pn64;
++ pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
++ pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
++ pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
++ pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
++ pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
+
+ ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
+
+@@ -418,8 +434,8 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+ return 0;
+
+ pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, 0);
+- ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, pos, len,
++ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
++ ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
+ pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -475,11 +491,12 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
+ }
+
+ if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
++ u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+ /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf, 1);
++ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
+
+ if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
+- key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf,
++ key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
+ skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
+ skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
+ skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/b43/xmit.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/b43/xmit.c
+@@ -323,8 +323,7 @@ int b43_generate_txhdr(struct b43_wldev
+ /* we give the phase1key and iv16 here, the key is stored in
+ * shm. With that the hardware can do phase 2 and encryption.
+ */
+- ieee80211_get_tkip_key(info->control.hw_key, skb_frag,
+- IEEE80211_TKIP_P1_KEY, (u8*)phase1key);
++ ieee80211_get_tkip_p1k(info->control.hw_key, skb_frag, phase1key);
+ /* phase1key is in host endian. Copy to little-endian txhdr->iv. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+ txhdr->iv[i * 2 + 0] = phase1key[i];
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/iwl-4965-tx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/iwl-4965-tx.c
+@@ -240,8 +240,7 @@ static void iwl4965_tx_cmd_build_hwcrypt
+
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+ tx_cmd->sec_ctl = TX_CMD_SEC_TKIP;
+- ieee80211_get_tkip_key(keyconf, skb_frag,
+- IEEE80211_TKIP_P2_KEY, tx_cmd->key);
++ ieee80211_get_tkip_p2k(keyconf, skb_frag, tx_cmd->key);
+ IWL_DEBUG_TX(priv, "tx_cmd with tkip hwcrypto\n");
+ break;
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-agn-tx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-agn-tx.c
+@@ -497,8 +497,7 @@ static void iwlagn_tx_cmd_build_hwcrypto
+
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+ tx_cmd->sec_ctl = TX_CMD_SEC_TKIP;
+- ieee80211_get_tkip_key(keyconf, skb_frag,
+- IEEE80211_TKIP_P2_KEY, tx_cmd->key);
++ ieee80211_get_tkip_p2k(keyconf, skb_frag, tx_cmd->key);
+ IWL_DEBUG_TX(priv, "tx_cmd with tkip hwcrypto\n");
+ break;
+
+--- a/include/net/mac80211.h
++++ b/include/net/mac80211.h
+@@ -960,21 +960,6 @@ enum sta_notify_cmd {
+ };
+
+ /**
+- * enum ieee80211_tkip_key_type - get tkip key
+- *
+- * Used by drivers which need to get a tkip key for skb. Some drivers need a
+- * phase 1 key, others need a phase 2 key. A single function allows the driver
+- * to get the key, this enum indicates what type of key is required.
+- *
+- * @IEEE80211_TKIP_P1_KEY: the driver needs a phase 1 key
+- * @IEEE80211_TKIP_P2_KEY: the driver needs a phase 2 key
+- */
+-enum ieee80211_tkip_key_type {
+- IEEE80211_TKIP_P1_KEY,
+- IEEE80211_TKIP_P2_KEY,
+-};
+-
+-/**
+ * enum ieee80211_hw_flags - hardware flags
+ *
+ * These flags are used to indicate hardware capabilities to
+@@ -2568,21 +2553,33 @@ struct sk_buff *
+ ieee80211_get_buffered_bc(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, struct ieee80211_vif *vif);
+
+ /**
+- * ieee80211_get_tkip_key - get a TKIP rc4 for skb
++ * ieee80211_get_tkip_p1k - get a TKIP phase 1 key
++ *
++ * This function returns the TKIP phase 1 key for the IV32 taken
++ * from the given packet.
++ *
++ * @keyconf: the parameter passed with the set key
++ * @skb: the packet to take the IV32 value from that will be encrypted
++ * with this P1K
++ * @p1k: a buffer to which the key will be written, as 5 u16 values
++ */
++void ieee80211_get_tkip_p1k(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
++ struct sk_buff *skb, u16 *p1k);
++
++/**
++ * ieee80211_get_tkip_p2k - get a TKIP phase 2 key
+ *
+- * This function computes a TKIP rc4 key for an skb. It computes
+- * a phase 1 key if needed (iv16 wraps around). This function is to
+- * be used by drivers which can do HW encryption but need to compute
+- * to phase 1/2 key in SW.
++ * This function computes the TKIP RC4 key for the IV values
++ * in the packet.
+ *
+ * @keyconf: the parameter passed with the set key
+- * @skb: the skb for which the key is needed
+- * @type: TBD
+- * @key: a buffer to which the key will be written
+- */
+-void ieee80211_get_tkip_key(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
+- struct sk_buff *skb,
+- enum ieee80211_tkip_key_type type, u8 *key);
++ * @skb: the packet to take the IV32/IV16 values from that will be
++ * encrypted with this key
++ * @p2k: a buffer to which the key will be written, 16 bytes
++ */
++void ieee80211_get_tkip_p2k(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
++ struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *p2k);
++
+ /**
+ * ieee80211_wake_queue - wake specific queue
+ * @hw: pointer as obtained from ieee80211_alloc_hw().
+--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
+@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ struct ieee80211_key *ieee80211_key_allo
+ get_unaligned_le16(seq);
+ }
+ }
++ spin_lock_init(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+ key->conf.iv_len = CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
+@@ -52,9 +52,10 @@ enum ieee80211_internal_tkip_state {
+ };
+
+ struct tkip_ctx {
+- u32 iv32;
+- u16 iv16;
+- u16 p1k[5];
++ u32 iv32; /* current iv32 */
++ u16 iv16; /* current iv16 */
++ u16 p1k[5]; /* p1k cache */
++ u32 p1k_iv32; /* iv32 for which p1k computed */
+ enum ieee80211_internal_tkip_state state;
+ };
+
+@@ -71,6 +72,9 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
+
+ union {
+ struct {
++ /* protects tx context */
++ spinlock_t txlock;
++
+ /* last used TSC */
+ struct tkip_ctx tx;
+
+@@ -78,7 +82,7 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
+ struct tkip_ctx rx[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES];
+ } tkip;
+ struct {
+- u8 tx_pn[6];
++ atomic64_t tx_pn;
+ /*
+ * Last received packet number. The first
+ * NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES counters are used with Data
+@@ -88,12 +92,9 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
+ u8 rx_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1][6];
+ struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+ u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
+- /* scratch buffers for virt_to_page() (crypto API) */
+ #ifndef AES_BLOCK_LEN
+ #define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16
+ #endif
+- u8 tx_crypto_buf[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+- u8 rx_crypto_buf[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+ } ccmp;
+ struct {
+ u8 tx_pn[6];
+--- a/net/mac80211/tkip.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/tkip.c
+@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ static void tkip_mixing_phase1(const u8
+ p1k[4] += tkipS(p1k[3] ^ get_unaligned_le16(tk + 0 + j)) + i;
+ }
+ ctx->state = TKIP_STATE_PHASE1_DONE;
++ ctx->p1k_iv32 = tsc_IV32;
+ }
+
+ static void tkip_mixing_phase2(const u8 *tk, struct tkip_ctx *ctx,
+@@ -140,60 +141,72 @@ static void tkip_mixing_phase2(const u8
+ /* Add TKIP IV and Ext. IV at @pos. @iv0, @iv1, and @iv2 are the first octets
+ * of the IV. Returns pointer to the octet following IVs (i.e., beginning of
+ * the packet payload). */
+-u8 *ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(u8 *pos, struct ieee80211_key *key, u16 iv16)
++u8 *ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(u8 *pos, struct ieee80211_key *key)
+ {
+- pos = write_tkip_iv(pos, iv16);
++ lockdep_assert_held(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
++
++ pos = write_tkip_iv(pos, key->u.tkip.tx.iv16);
+ *pos++ = (key->conf.keyidx << 6) | (1 << 5) /* Ext IV */;
+ put_unaligned_le32(key->u.tkip.tx.iv32, pos);
+ return pos + 4;
+ }
+
+-void ieee80211_get_tkip_key(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
+- struct sk_buff *skb, enum ieee80211_tkip_key_type type,
+- u8 *outkey)
++static void ieee80211_compute_tkip_p1k(struct ieee80211_key *key, u32 iv32)
+ {
+- struct ieee80211_key *key = (struct ieee80211_key *)
+- container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
+- struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+- u8 *data;
+- const u8 *tk;
+- struct tkip_ctx *ctx;
+- u16 iv16;
+- u32 iv32;
+-
+- data = (u8 *)hdr + ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+- iv16 = data[2] | (data[0] << 8);
+- iv32 = get_unaligned_le32(&data[4]);
+-
+- tk = &key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_ENCR_KEY];
+- ctx = &key->u.tkip.tx;
+-
+-#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_TKIP_DEBUG
+- printk(KERN_DEBUG "TKIP encrypt: iv16 = 0x%04x, iv32 = 0x%08x\n",
+- iv16, iv32);
++ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata;
++ struct tkip_ctx *ctx = &key->u.tkip.tx;
++ const u8 *tk = &key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_ENCR_KEY];
+
+- if (iv32 != ctx->iv32) {
+- printk(KERN_DEBUG "skb: iv32 = 0x%08x key: iv32 = 0x%08x\n",
+- iv32, ctx->iv32);
+- printk(KERN_DEBUG "Wrap around of iv16 in the middle of a "
+- "fragmented packet\n");
+- }
+-#endif
++ lockdep_assert_held(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
+
+- /* Update the p1k only when the iv16 in the packet wraps around, this
+- * might occur after the wrap around of iv16 in the key in case of
+- * fragmented packets. */
+- if (iv16 == 0 || ctx->state == TKIP_STATE_NOT_INIT)
+- tkip_mixing_phase1(tk, ctx, hdr->addr2, iv32);
++ /*
++ * Update the P1K when the IV32 is different from the value it
++ * had when we last computed it (or when not initialised yet).
++ * This might flip-flop back and forth if packets are processed
++ * out-of-order due to the different ACs, but then we have to
++ * just compute the P1K more often.
++ */
++ if (ctx->p1k_iv32 != iv32 || ctx->state == TKIP_STATE_NOT_INIT)
++ tkip_mixing_phase1(tk, ctx, sdata->vif.addr, iv32);
++}
+
+- if (type == IEEE80211_TKIP_P1_KEY) {
+- memcpy(outkey, ctx->p1k, sizeof(u16) * 5);
+- return;
+- }
++void ieee80211_get_tkip_p1k(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
++ struct sk_buff *skb, u16 *p1k)
++{
++ struct ieee80211_key *key = (struct ieee80211_key *)
++ container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
++ struct tkip_ctx *ctx = &key->u.tkip.tx;
++ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
++ const u8 *data = (u8 *)hdr + ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
++ u32 iv32 = get_unaligned_le32(&data[4]);
++ unsigned long flags;
++
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
++ ieee80211_compute_tkip_p1k(key, iv32);
++ memcpy(p1k, ctx->p1k, sizeof(ctx->p1k));
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_tkip_p1k);
+
+- tkip_mixing_phase2(tk, ctx, iv16, outkey);
++void ieee80211_get_tkip_p2k(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
++ struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *p2k)
++{
++ struct ieee80211_key *key = (struct ieee80211_key *)
++ container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
++ const u8 *tk = &key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_ENCR_KEY];
++ struct tkip_ctx *ctx = &key->u.tkip.tx;
++ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
++ const u8 *data = (u8 *)hdr + ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
++ u32 iv32 = get_unaligned_le32(&data[4]);
++ u16 iv16 = data[2] | (data[0] << 8);
++ unsigned long flags;
++
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
++ ieee80211_compute_tkip_p1k(key, iv32);
++ tkip_mixing_phase2(tk, ctx, iv16, p2k);
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_tkip_key);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_tkip_p2k);
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt packet payload with TKIP using @key. @pos is a pointer to the
+@@ -204,19 +217,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_tkip_key);
+ */
+ int ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(struct crypto_cipher *tfm,
+ struct ieee80211_key *key,
+- u8 *pos, size_t payload_len, u8 *ta)
++ struct sk_buff *skb,
++ u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
+ {
+ u8 rc4key[16];
+- struct tkip_ctx *ctx = &key->u.tkip.tx;
+- const u8 *tk = &key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_ENCR_KEY];
+-
+- /* Calculate per-packet key */
+- if (ctx->iv16 == 0 || ctx->state == TKIP_STATE_NOT_INIT)
+- tkip_mixing_phase1(tk, ctx, ta, ctx->iv32);
+
+- tkip_mixing_phase2(tk, ctx, ctx->iv16, rc4key);
++ ieee80211_get_tkip_p2k(&key->conf, skb, rc4key);
+
+- return ieee80211_wep_encrypt_data(tfm, rc4key, 16, pos, payload_len);
++ return ieee80211_wep_encrypt_data(tfm, rc4key, 16,
++ payload, payload_len);
+ }
+
+ /* Decrypt packet payload with TKIP using @key. @pos is a pointer to the
+--- a/net/mac80211/tkip.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/tkip.h
+@@ -13,11 +13,13 @@
+ #include <linux/crypto.h>
+ #include "key.h"
+
+-u8 *ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(u8 *pos, struct ieee80211_key *key, u16 iv16);
++u8 *ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(u8 *pos, struct ieee80211_key *key);
+
+ int ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(struct crypto_cipher *tfm,
+- struct ieee80211_key *key,
+- u8 *pos, size_t payload_len, u8 *ta);
++ struct ieee80211_key *key,
++ struct sk_buff *skb,
++ u8 *payload, size_t payload_len);
++
+ enum {
+ TKIP_DECRYPT_OK = 0,
+ TKIP_DECRYPT_NO_EXT_IV = -1,
+--- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
+@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ static int ieee80211_get_key(struct wiph
+ u8 seq[6] = {0};
+ struct key_params params;
+ struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
++ u64 pn64;
+ u32 iv32;
+ u16 iv16;
+ int err = -ENOENT;
+@@ -256,12 +257,13 @@ static int ieee80211_get_key(struct wiph
+ params.seq_len = 6;
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+- seq[0] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[5];
+- seq[1] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[4];
+- seq[2] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[3];
+- seq[3] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[2];
+- seq[4] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[1];
+- seq[5] = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn[0];
++ pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
++ seq[0] = pn64;
++ seq[1] = pn64 >> 8;
++ seq[2] = pn64 >> 16;
++ seq[3] = pn64 >> 24;
++ seq[4] = pn64 >> 32;
++ seq[5] = pn64 >> 40;
+ params.seq = seq;
+ params.seq_len = 6;
+ break;
+--- a/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
+@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static ssize_t key_tx_spec_read(struct f
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+ {
+ const u8 *tpn;
++ u64 pn;
+ char buf[20];
+ int len;
+ struct ieee80211_key *key = file->private_data;
+@@ -94,9 +95,10 @@ static ssize_t key_tx_spec_read(struct f
+ key->u.tkip.tx.iv16);
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+- tpn = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn;
++ pn = atomic64_read(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
+ len = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x\n",
+- tpn[0], tpn[1], tpn[2], tpn[3], tpn[4], tpn[5]);
++ (u8)(pn >> 40), (u8)(pn >> 32), (u8)(pn >> 24),
++ (u8)(pn >> 16), (u8)(pn >> 8), (u8)pn);
+ break;
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+ tpn = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn;
diff --git a/package/mac80211/patches/420-mac80211_ignore_invalid_ccmp_rx_pn.patch b/package/mac80211/patches/420-mac80211_ignore_invalid_ccmp_rx_pn.patch
index f6793541f..0222f54b6 100644
--- a/package/mac80211/patches/420-mac80211_ignore_invalid_ccmp_rx_pn.patch
+++ b/package/mac80211/patches/420-mac80211_ignore_invalid_ccmp_rx_pn.patch
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
-@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
+@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
* Management frames.
*/
u8 rx_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1][6];
+ u8 rx_invalid_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1];
struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
- /* scratch buffers for virt_to_page() (crypto API) */
+ #ifndef AES_BLOCK_LEN
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
-@@ -441,6 +441,13 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct iee
+@@ -457,6 +457,13 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct iee
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
-@@ -453,6 +460,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
+@@ -469,6 +476,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN];
int data_len;
int queue;
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
-@@ -486,6 +494,11 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
+@@ -503,6 +511,11 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-12-27 08:23:05 +0000