diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-1387.patch | 53 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-2409.patch | 59 |
2 files changed, 112 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-1387.patch b/package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-1387.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7a2a47e9b --- /dev/null +++ b/package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-1387.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +http://bugs.gentoo.org/270305 + +fix from upstream + +--- a/ssl/d1_both.c ++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c +@@ -585,30 +585,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, + } + } + +- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len); +- if ( frag == NULL) +- goto err; ++ if (frag_len) ++ { ++ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len); ++ if ( frag == NULL) ++ goto err; + +- memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); ++ memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); + +- if (frag_len) +- { +- /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ ++ /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read) */ + i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + frag->fragment,frag_len,0); + if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + goto err; +- } + +- pq_64bit_init(&seq64); +- pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq); ++ pq_64bit_init(&seq64); ++ pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq); + +- item = pitem_new(seq64, frag); +- pq_64bit_free(&seq64); +- if ( item == NULL) +- goto err; ++ item = pitem_new(seq64, frag); ++ pq_64bit_free(&seq64); ++ if ( item == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); ++ } + +- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); + return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; + + err: diff --git a/package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-2409.patch b/package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-2409.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4800968aa --- /dev/null +++ b/package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-2409.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +http://bugs.gentoo.org/280591 + +fix from upstream + +http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=18260 + +--- a/crypto/evp/c_alld.c ++++ b/crypto/evp/c_alld.c +@@ -64,9 +64,6 @@ + + void OpenSSL_add_all_digests(void) + { +-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 +- EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2()); +-#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 + EVP_add_digest(EVP_md4()); + #endif +--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c ++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +@@ -986,7 +986,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CT + while (n >= 0) + { + ctx->error_depth=n; +- if (!xs->valid) ++ ++ /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates. It ++ * doesn't add any security and just wastes time. ++ */ ++ if (!xs->valid && xs != xi) + { + if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) + { +@@ -996,13 +1000,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CT + if (!ok) goto end; + } + else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) +- /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert, +- * this is a waste of time. That check should +- * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be +- * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but +- * we don't verify again and again in SSL +- * handshakes and the like once the cert has +- * been declared trusted. */ + { + ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; + ctx->current_cert=xs; +--- a/ssl/ssl_algs.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_algs.c +@@ -92,9 +92,6 @@ int SSL_library_init(void) + EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc()); + #endif + +-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 +- EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2()); +-#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 + EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5()); + EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl2-md5"); |